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Miranda Revisited
Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics. By Liva Baker. New York:
Atheneum, 1983. Pp. 463. $22.95.
Gerald M. Caplan t
From a lawyer's perspective, appellate court decisions, particularly
those of the Supreme Court, generate principles; they are the carriers of
rules to guide us in the future. The litigants are incidental. Thus, a law-
yer views Miranda v. Arizona' not as a crisis in the life of a disadvan-
taged, crime-prone young man or of the teenager he abducted and raped,
nor even as a vignette about the personalities and performances of the
lawyers trying the case; rather it exists as a set of rules that grants one in
custody certain heretofore unannounced rights. In the typical law review
article, Miranda and its offspring are evaluated primarily in terms of
their consistency with one another. "Is this latest decision a faithful appli-
cation, or a novel departure?" the lawyer asks. How Miranda collided
with rooted police practices and values and how implementation varied
from the public's expectations are not generally the lawyer's concern.
There are good reasons for this apparently disinterested attitude toward
the social impact of judicial decisions. Lawyers are not social scientists;
they lack the skills (and inclination) for empirical investigation, particu-
larly if it involves mathematics and measurement over time.2 Moreover,
the results of such research, even when conclusive (which is uncommon),
may be irrelevant to the lawyer's ongoing work in negotiating pleas and
making final settlements.
But the law is nonetheless a body of influential social information, and
t Professor of Law, National Law Center, George Washington University.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38, 43, 45. For an outstanding
empirical study of the impact of a Supreme Court decision by a lawyer who is also a political scientist,
see W. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND AIrrDE CHANGE (1967).
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judicial decisions do have consequences both for those involved in the par-
ticular case and for society as a whole. To the layperson, the important
questions about Miranda are likely to be: "Has it worked? Are suspects
treated better? Have the police lost effectiveness?" The rest is seen as
lawyers' musing-fussing about with precedent.
The merit of Liva Baker's energetic book is her attention to these ne-
glected matters.8 From her, we learn about Ernesto Miranda's life, we
track the evolution of the decision from complaint to final appeal, and we
see the case as fodder for national political debate about law enforcement
and crime control. For Baker, Miranda is the window for an historical
look at the politics of civil liberties and crime control, and the characters
include Earl Warren, Richard Nixon, and Warren Burger.
On the whole, Baker's approach works. Miranda does provide a useful
filter for exploring the principles and contradictions of our approach to-
ward crime and punishment. The challenge of fashioning a system that
balances the restraints on both the governed and the government is per-
haps nowhere more apparent than in the stationhouse confrontation be-
tween police and suspect.
From Baker's account, Miranda emerges as a stereotypical felony de-
fendant-a disadvantaged member of a minority, unsuccessful, undis-
ciplined, a repeat offender. At seven, his mother was dead and his family
was disintegrating around him. He was a "throw-away," a kid nobody
much cared about, forced to look after himself. It is thus no surprise that
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, Miranda was arrested six
times and went to prison for four of those offenses. By the time he reached
his twenties, he was a suspected armed robber, a proven sex offender, and
a dangerous drifter.
Whether there was much more to him is unclear from the record. After
raping his teenage victim, Miranda told her: "Whether you tell your
mother what has happened or not is none of my business, but pray for
me."'4 A manipulative ploy surely, but was it a stirring of conscience as
well?
As to Miranda's conviction, it was, at least from one perspective, simply
the product of good police work. Miranda's victim, a pathetically shy girl,
was so slow and easily confused that she appeared to be lying even when
truthful. There were also observable discrepancies in her account. The
doctors insisted that she wasn't a virgin. When Miranda was placed in a
lineup with only two others, she could not positively identify him. But the
detectives, convinced nonetheless that her story was true, tricked Miranda.
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When, following the lineup, he inquired of them, "How did I do?," they
replied, "You flunked."
'5
Then the questioning began. As interrogations go, it was a mild
event-short, lasting two hours, conducted in mid-day and by just two
investigators. There was no hint of force. Miranda's own account of the
interrogation essentially corroborated that of the officers. At the end, Mi-
randa confessed to not only the rape under investigation, but to attempting
a second, and to trying to rob still a third person. When his confession
had been reduced to writing, the officers brought his victim into the inter-
rogation room, and in response to a question, Miranda stated: "That's the
girl."'
When Miranda identified his victim, he believed that she had already
picked him out of the lineup; however, it was not this deception, nor was
it the length or intensity of the interrogation (two hours is a very long
time to one in Miranda's shoes), nor was it the failure of the police to
make a verbatim record of the questioning (to avoid the characteristic
swearing contest between suspect and police over what really happened),
that bothered the Supreme Court three years later. Rather, it was concern
that the police had not told Miranda that he had a right to counsel.
That the Phoenix detectives had not so informed Miranda was under-
standable. Such a right had not yet been discovered in the Constitution,
and it was a rare police department that accorded suspects greater rights
than the Warren Court conferred. Moreover, only a few years earlier, in
Crooker v. California, the Court had dismissed a similar suggestion, ob-
serving that the presence of counsel would interfere with 'fair as well as
unfair" questioning."
With Miranda's confession to bolster an otherwise weak case, the gov-
ernment proceeded to trial. Its prosecution was not much impeded by de-
fense counsel, an elderly, court-appointed practitioner with an open dis-
taste for his assignment: "You know," he told the jury, "perhaps a doctor
doesn't enjoy operating for locked bowels, but he has to . . ."' Counsel
called no witnesses and offered no evidence. He did, however, cross-
examine the government witnesses, specifically asking one of the detectives
whether he informed suspects "that they are entitled to the services of an
attorney before they make a statement." 9 And he did object to the admis-
sion of his client's confession on the mistaken but prophetic grounds that
5. P. 12.
6. P. 13.
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"the Supreme Court of the United States says a man is entitled to an
attorney at the time of his arrest."1
In contrast to trial counsel, much can be said about the skill and devo-
tion of Miranda's appellate lawyers, John Frank and the late John
Flynn, who shepherded the case from the Arizona to the United States
Supreme Court. Their advocacy credits the profession, and Baker's thor-
oughly researched account details how they proceeded. But the prose is
purplish: Her impulse is to write melodrama. Baker soars when it would
be better to keep both feet on the ground,1" and the overall effect is some-
times to diminish rather than highlight the real achievements of the
attorneys.
As to Miranda himself, the victory in the Supreme Court brought him
enduring fame, but no recognition of a practical sort. When his case was
retried, acquittal seemed likely; without his confession, the government's
case was thin. But the police pulled a rabbit out of the hat, locating Mi-
randa's common law wife, to whom, during his initial incarceration in
1963, he admitted his guilt. Now, carrying a grudge against him, she
readily repeated to Phoenix detectives what her husband had told her.
Once again, Miranda was convicted and sentenced to twenty to thirty
years in the Arizona State Prison.12
There he seems to have caught his balance. He became, as many in his
circumstances do, thoughtful about the need for prison reform, and ex-
pressed some hope for a better future for himself." But rehabilitation
eluded him. Paroled after serving nine years, he wound up on the court-
house steps in downtown Phoenix selling autographed Miranda cards,
similar to the ones the police were by then carrying. A year later, his
parole was revoked when he was found in possession of narcotics, and one
year after that, in 1976, he was knifed to death following an argument
during a poker game.'
As to the impact of Miranda v. Arizona on the crime rate, which has
been spiraling since the early 1960's, an assessment is more difficult. Here
Baker is the most derivative and the least satisfying. When it comes to
evaluating Miranda, she is more cheerleader than social scientist. "Al-
though the United States Supreme Court had vacillated, hesitated, even
10. Id.
11. For example, while it is true that the Supreme Court addresses important issues, it is not true
that the issues are "always complex, difficult of resolution, and the consequences for a whole nation,
serious." P. 64 (emphasis in original). Nor is it accurate enough to say that "crime is only another
symptom of underlying rage," p. 379, or that policymakers had taken "no notice of 200 years of racial
discrimination and the psychology of rebellion," id. But this is the way Baker writes, and the reader
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sometimes reversed its direction during the three decades since it had for
the first time, in Brown v. Mississippi (1936), reversed a conviction be-
cause a confession had been coerced, it had been headed all along toward
[the Miranda decision]."1 5 Miranda was "the highest achievement of civil
libertarianism as translated into constitutional terms by the U.S. Supreme
Court."" The "lucidity" of the opinion was "surpassed only by its high
moral tone."1 7 After Miranda, "there was no longer any need for people
with trouble to stand alone in front of the people with uniforms; the peo-
ple with trouble now possessed the Constitution."18
Characteristically, attempts to alter patterns of behavior bring mixed
and unexpected results. Philosophy professor William Barrett speaks of
"that deepest and most vexing trait of the human condition itself: that our
efforts are always ineradicably a mixture of good and evil."1 9 The Warren
Court's effort to introduce equality of treatment for defendants brought
about much-needed, long-overdue change, but the process was not without
cost. The writer must chart this tension or risk writing propaganda rather
than history. Although Baker acknowledges the objections of the oppo-
nents of Miranda, she does so mechanically, out of professional duty
rather than out of genuine interest, and does not sense that in this compli-
cated environment, "true progress would consist in a change that did not
leave behind as many advantages as it offers new ones."20 For example,
one could suppose that Miranda's value lies in raising our sensibility to-
ward others, in treating those suspected of mean and avaricious acts with
generosity (by informing them of the risks of disclosing the truth); yet, one
might also worry that the untutored thief or mugger might think us fool-
ish, despise us for our benevolence, and see our concern as an encourage-
ment to more wrongdoing. But Baker does not engage in this kind of un-
tangling, sorting out, and weighing. Ultimately the reader has the feeling
of a Sir Walter Scott romance rather than a search for existential fact. In
this regard, Baker rivals lawyers, advocates who through training and
habit overstate their case and derogate the positions of the opposition, and





19. W. BARNETT, THE ILLUSION OF TECHNIQUE 25 (Anchor ed. 1979).
20. As one author notes:
Why does disillusionment follow the revolutionary victory? Simply because of the prior illu-
sion that the overthrow of the existing regime will not affect present benefits; it will add to
them the new ones desired. But once the change has been fought and bled for, it turns out that
no addition but only an exchange has taken place, at great cost.
J. BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 96 (1983).
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functional hyperbole and reductionism may be when settling or litigating
a case, they are treacherous tools for the historian or policymaker.
But one does not have to rely on Baker's assessment to put Miranda
into sharper perspective. Unlike most other Supreme Court decisions, Mi-
randa was immediately singled out by researchers for study, and several
major empirical investigations were conducted in the wake of the opinion
to gauge its impact. Two of the most prominent of these, one undertaken
in New Haven, the other in the District of Columbia, concluded that Mi-
randa was not achieving the anticipated results: Waiver of the rights con-
ferred-to remain silent and to be represented by counsel-was routine.21
According to the studies, the reason for the unexpectedly high incidence
of waiver was, first, that suspects did not understand their new rights, and
second, that the police, acting out of bad faith or carelessness, were not
making themselves clear. 2 Indeed, official compliance with Miranda was
perceived as so lagging as late as 1970 that a Miranda dissenter, retired
Justice Tom Clark, urged the police and prosecution to conform to the
law: "Although Miranda v. Arizona. . .has been on the books. . . since
1966 and has been publicized more widely than any opinion of the Court
since Brown v. Board of Education . . . the mandate of the case is fol-
lowed in the breach . . . . [I]t is suggested that the prosecutors enforce
Miranda to the letter and that police obey it with like diligence ....1,23
Later studies, however, showed a significant change. The police exhib-
ited greater fidelity in carrying out the assignment the Court had made to
them in Miranda, and perhaps more important, as Miranda became a
household word, suspects comprehended the rights it conferred.24
21. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1394-95 (1968); Project, Interrogations in
New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1523, 1591 (1967).
22. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 21, at 1394-95; Project, supra note 21, at 1550-54.
For a summary of the findings of the various empirical studies undertaken following the Miranda
decision, see 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 165-200 (1973).
23. United States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1970).
24. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1,
30-31 (1970) (FBI and Colorado Springs police department honor requests to have attorney present
during questioning though Denver police do not; suspects are aware of Miranda rights); Stephens,
Flanders & Cannon, Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Perceptions of the Miranda
Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407, 418 (1972) (detectives in each of four jurisdictions making
regular use of "Miranda cards"). A three-year study of police interrogation practices concerning
juveniles concluded that Miranda warnings were read in about 80% or more of the cases studied
during 1974-76. T. GRisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 30 (1981); cf. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 150, 164-65 (1980) (studies may overstate degree
of nonconformity with Miranda during transition period).
As the following anecdote illustrates, there is the possibility that at least a few suspects become
more, rather than less, inclined to incriminate themselves when the police effectively warn them of
their constitutional rights.
A psychiatrist employed by an institution always told his interviewees that what they told him
would not be kept confidential from the institution; he noticed, however, that interviewees
seemed to reveal more when told this. He realized that his frankness, though ethically re-
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Yet the high incidence of waiver continued.2 5
Herein lies the enigma. Why is it that so many suspects act contrary to
self-interest by waiving their rights and informing against themselves?
In an earlier time, we would have linked confession to remorse. A
psalmist recounts: "As long as I would not speak, my bones wasted away
with my groaning all the day, . . .my strength was dried up as by the
heat of summer. Then I acknowledged my sin to you, my guilt I covered
not . . . . [A]nd you took away the guilt of my sin."26 Confession can
thus be understood as a sitting in judgment on one's self. Paradoxically,
the offender isolates himself from his wrongful act by accepting responsi-
bility for it, and his confession becomes a remedial act. It sets him straight
with God and his fellow man. It reveals that he, like others, is a person
with a conscience who endorses the moral order, absolves his accusers of
blame, and invites the community to receive him back.2" In the criminal
law today, however, the link between confession and contrition seems
faint. It may be that the person who comes forward to acknowledge his
offense is less blameworthy, that he sees the error of his ways and is on
the path to correction, but the discount he receives for entering his plea of
guilty is better understood in terms of the lack of resources to bring to
trial all those who have been charged. 8
Among the experts, there is now general agreement that Miranda con-
tained a central flaw, an internal contradiction, that greatly diluted its
strength: The Court made the police its messenger, and as Professor Yale
Kamisar has put it, "[A]ny police officer 'worth his salt' will be sorely
tempted to get the suspect to talk." 9 In the same vein, Dean Edward
Barrett asked, "[I]s it the duty of the police to persuade the suspect to talk
or persuade him not to talk? They cannot be expected to do both." 30
quired, was acting as a "seduction" to candor by conveying openness and honesty.
T. GUTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 289 (1982)
(emphasis in original).
25. 0. STEPHENS, supra note 22, at 173.
26. Psalm 32:3-5 (New American).
27. "In the parables, the sheep returns to the flock, the prodigal son to his family home: Each
'was dead and is alive;. . . was lost and is found."' Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of
the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 477-78 (1984) (footnote omitted). Professor Burt observes that the
parables hold out "the ideal of community not simply as a morally worthy pursuit but as a haven
from chaos, from personally vulnerable isolation, from the prospect of death itself." Id. at 477.
28. None of the recent national commissions that have studied plea bargaining mention the atti-
tude of the offender toward his crime as a factor to be considered in the government's charging deci-
sion. See ABA PROJECr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295-312 (1974); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY To REDUCE CRIME 97-98
(1973); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9-13 (1967).
29. Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 85 (1980).
30. Brief of Edward L. Barrett, Jr., as amicus curiae, at 9, People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398
P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965) (on rehearing) (cited in Y. KAMISAR, supra note 29, at 85).
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Baker herself notes one of the "inherent weaknesses" of M1iranda-"it
allowed a suspect to waive his rights without the advice of a lawyer.
'31
This last observation has its origins, as do so many of the recommenda-
tions for change in the law of confessions, in the writings of Professor
Kamisar. 2 To Kamisar, Miranda fails in its essential purpose because
self-accusation under police prodding is still the typical response. 33 His
conclusion flows from the logic of the decision itself, at least if one thinks
of the case in syllogistic terms. But perhaps there is another way of look-
ing at it, a way of characterizing Miranda as a success or partial success,
though not by its own terms.
In retrospect, it is easier to imagine Miranda as not only the culmina-
tion of a trend of judicial decisions but also as part of a wave of funda-
mental changes occurring in American life in the 1960's. Miranda was
decided when blood was actually being spilled in the streets. There were
civil rights protests in the South and civil disorders in urban areas else-
where. On national television, black protesters were bullied and beaten,
black rioters beaten and shot. Miranda itself looked back on a recent past
of the third degree, applied particularly to blacks.
Against this violence, powerful forces mobilized, determined to preserve
order by linking the emerging crime problem to racism and poverty, two
of its most prominent "root causes." President Lyndon Johnson led the
way, proposing a "Great Society" where there would be "an end to pov-
erty and racial injustice," '34 where both crime in the streets and police
brutality would be banished.35 The setting was one of great dissatisfaction
with the past and soaring ambitions for the future, and in this setting
Miranda's arch message was less a blueprint for implementation than a
general instruction that things would have to change. The Court was tell-
ing the police that the old ways were not good enough.
Within a few years of the decision, by the early 1970's, there was, at
least in a technical sense, substantial compliance by the police; moreover,
the police were generally more restrained in their interrogation methods.36
If one takes Miranda, somewhat arbitrarily, as a benchmark, then this
can be said: Before Miranda, charges of physical force, questioning in
31. P. 407.
32. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 29, at 223.
33. Id. at 222.
34. 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, LYNDON B. JOHNSON
1963-64, at 704 (1965) (remarks at the University of Michigan, May 22, 1964); cf. Caplan, Crimi-
nology, Criminal Justice, and the War on Crime, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1976) (discussing need for
fairness in efforts at controlling crime).
35. See generally Caplan, Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968, 1973 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 583 (discussing history and effectiveness of federal law enforcement assistance program).
36. See 0. STEPHENS, supra note 22, at 165-200.
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relays, and sustained incommunicado detention were common;37 after Mi-
randa, they became far less frequent."8 Only a handful of nations can
boast of a similar status, and of those that can-England, for example-I
suspect none charted so revolutionary a course in so brief a time as here.
These days we seem hesitant to acknowledge our accomplishments. We do
not credit the improvement in police conduct toward the community in
general and suspects in particular. But both seem real and substantial.
In short, one can track Miranda this way: The decision curbed the
police in their historic excesses, the kinds of abuse of suspects that charac-
terized earlier appeals to the Court, but left law enforcement officials free
to obtain confessions by more tolerable methods, such as deception. Sus-
pects are no longer greatly abused, but neither is the state losing that
many cases for want of self-incriminating statements. Arguably, it is a
reasonable compromise.
Still, before one endorses such a compromise, its premises should be
subjected to further scrutiny. One way of doing this is to go back to the
earlier critiques of Miranda. Is there any merit to the once popular, but
now discredited, arguments of those who insisted that Miranda would
cause crime to multiply?39 Certainly, the most dire prophecies have not
come true. Although crime rates have climbed dramatically, as predicted,
there is no basis for isolating Miranda as a prime causal force. But it does
37. Such practices are sometimes classified as instances of the "third degree." The term itself has
no precise usage, but typically refers to the use of force (or threatened use of force) in combination
with such physical hardships as the denial of sleep and food, and prolonged questioning by a team of
investigators. From the perspective of the suspect, the third degree loomed as a confrontation without
limits. Unless one confessed, the questions would never cease-or so it might seem.
A review of police practices during the first half of the century leaves no doubt that the use of the
third degree was common. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
(WICKERSHAM COMMISSION), REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931); Keedy,
The Third Degree and Legal Interrogation of Suspects, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (1937); Note, The
Third Degree, 43 HARv. L. REV. 617 (1930). Although most of the early Supreme Court decisions
dealt with police misconduct in the South where the third degree was fueled by racial prejudice and
the prospect of lynch mobs, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), in fact the problem was
national, not regional.
38. Though this observation cannot be documented by reference to particular studies, it does not
seem controversial. There seems to be agreement among the judges, prosecutors and defense counsel I
have consulted that abuse of suspects, psychological as well as physical, in the stationhouse has de-
clined dramatically. Items in the daily newspapers concerning this particular type of police brutality
are uncommon. Still, there are occasional well-publicized incidents that indicate that in some places at
some times suspects are still abused. See Z. NEUMANN & Z. MARINOW, THE HOMICIDE FILES
(1977) (reprinting series of articles appearing in Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 24-27, 1977). More
recently, law enforcement officials in two rural counties in Texas have been charged in unrelated
incidents for beating suspects and exposing them to "water torture." Department of Justice Press
Release No. 1983-03 (Mar. 18, 1983); id. No. 1983-07 (July 19, 1983).
39. Justice White, for example, argued that many criminals "will now, under this new version of
the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at all or will be acquitted," and that the effect of Miranda
will be to return a killer, a rapist or other criminal to the streets . . . to repeat his crime whenever it
pleases him." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 542 (White, J., dissenting); see Inbau, Police Inter-
rogation-A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 16 (1961), reprinted in
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
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not necessarily follow, as the conventional wisdom today holds (even
among police and prosecutors) that Miranda produced no adverse conse-
quences for public safety. The difficulty in measuring its current impact
lies in the absence of empirical data.
Some clues may be gathered from the early studies evaluating the initial
implementation of Miranda. The New Haven study concluded that
"warnings were a factor in reducing the success of interrogation in only
eight of the 81 cases which could be evaluated."40 It further observed that
"questioning was necessary to solve a crime in less than ten percent of the
felony cases in which an arrest was made and ...Miranda may have
adversely affected a necessary interrogation for only 6 of the 127 suspects
whose interrogations we witnessed . ". .. 'A study in Pittsburgh found
a reduction in confessions of seventeen percent of all cases handled by the
detective division following Miranda, and a twenty-five percent drop in
robbery cases. It also found that in twenty percent of the cases a confes-
sion was probably necessary to obtain a conviction, and that there was
approximately a twenty-five percent higher conviction rate for suspects
who confessed.42
These studies were undertaken shortly after Miranda was decided, at a
time when Miranda had not been fully implemented by the police and
when the warnings were not well understood by suspects. Hence, they
fail, as Professor Berger notes, "to conclusively tell us what Miranda
would mean if followed in letter and spirit. '4 3 Probably, there would be a
further reduction in convictions, perhaps a significant one.
Putting aside the numbers, there is something unsettling, though not
easy to identify, in the way the researchers treat their subject. The Denver
study notes that "some law enforcement objectives might be adversely af-
fected by a nonwaivable Miranda right" 4 as if all that were involved was
the pursuit of narrow self-raising bureaucratic goals. The New Haven
Study observes that warnings were a factor in "only" ten percent of the
cases.45 And a more recent study of robbery in Oakland concludes that
"[c]onfessions are relatively unimportant, being judged as essential for
only 5-10 percent of the charged suspects.""' These studies reduce crime
to something remote and abstract, a string of numbers, an event that one
40. See Project, supra note 21, at 1563.
41. Id. at 1523.
42. Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1,
11, 15-16 (1967).
43. M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 131 (1980) (emphasis in original).
44. Leiken, supra note 24, at 50 (emphasis added).
45. Project, supra note 21, at 1563.
46. F. Feeney & A. Weir, The Prevention and Control of Robbery 48 (1974) (unpublished man-
uscript on file with author) (emphasis added).
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reads about in the newspapers, something that happens in another part of
town. There is no hint of rape as a nightmare come alive, or robbery as a
ruinous matter. But this latter context seems as real as any other for judg-
ing police interrogation.
Perhaps more important, the studies treat confession in essentially indi-
vidual terms. But confession is also an act with consequences for the com-
munity. This is more than just another way of asserting that there is a
societal interest in the identification and reformation of criminal offenders,
or that the unrepentent wrongdoer poses a continuing danger to the com-
munity. The principal value of confession may lie elsewhere, in its im-
plicit reaffirmation of the moral order. The offender by his confession ac-
knowledges that he is to blame, not the community. By presenting himself
as a victim of his own errors, his own weaknesses, as an ordinary man
who has gone astray and is anxious to make amends, he reassures us. His
confession is of value, not because it illuminates the dark corners of an
alien mind, but, conversely, because it confirms the existence of a shared
ethical view, a common human nature.
When Father Brown, G.K. Chesterton's fictional detective, is asked to
describe his method of investigation, he reports that the gist of it is that he
identifies with the criminal. "I mean that I thought and thought about
how a man might come to be like that, until I realized that I really was
like that, in everything except actual final consent to the action."4 In
other words, the criminal too is a member of the community, potentially
recognizable as one of us. And when we admit ourselves capable of com-
mitting his crime "in everything but final consent" and he exhibits re-
morse over having given "final consent to the action," we merge and are
changed.
If it is true, as Father Brown asserts, that "[w]hat we all dread most
. . . is a maze with no centre, '48 that is, a place without moral meaning,
then the contrition of the offender dispels the nightmare and contributes to
our capacity to reiterate the basic distinctions between good and evil. And
this is so even when the forum is the police stationhouse, and the commu-
nity representatives are uniformed officers, and the confession, far from
being volunteered, comes into being only after insistent encouragement.
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47. G. CHESTERTON, THE SECRET OF FATHER BROWN 9-10 (1927).
48. G. CHESTERTON, THE WISDOM OF FATHER BROWN 150 (1912).
Max Weber's Philosophy
Max Weber. By Anthony T. Kronman. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1983. Pp. x, 214. $18.50.
Nancy L. Schwartzt
Max Weber is the premier social scientist of this century, having intro-
duced a political sociology that is at once interpretive and explanatory.'
His work stands alone in its breadth, depth, and sophistication, alone also
in the power and pain of its unresolved tensions. His range was vast, with
comparative work spanning continents and centuries. He studied fields as
diverse as politics, economics, science, and religion. He asked deep ques-
tions about their meaning and their coming into being in the modern age.
Weber's work contains the outline and content of a coherent, if controver-
sial, sociology.
While acknowledging these accomplishments, Anthony Kronman's ele-
gant Max Weber' makes the more unusual claim that Weber's sociology,
and specifically his sociology of law, shares certain philosophical assump-
tions with the entire Weberian corpus, and that these assumptions provide
a consistent model of man and society. Kronman is uniquely equipped to
make this argument, having been schooled in philosophy and law, to
which he brings the gift of masterful expository skills. Weber has thus
found a friend, one who appreciates the density of his thought without
compounding it, and who makes Weber clear by rendering explicit his
presuppositions. Yet we may ask: Is this the real Max Weber?
I. THE WILL AND ITS RELATION TO REASON
A. Weber's Philosophical Model of Man
Weber's philosophical model of man, according to Kronman, is of a
being who chooses meaning by exercising his will. Though it is their
characteristic feature as humans to need and want significance, men exist
in a world devoid of objective meaning. No values are given, and factual
knowledge does not confer value on things. Men must therefore create
t Assistant Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.
1. Interpretive knowledge concerns the meaning of a set of social practices; explanatory knowledge
concerns their causes. Interpretation (or hermeneutics or exegesis) and explanation (or causal under-
standing) are related but distinct kinds of knowledge; precisely how they are related is a major issue
in the philosophy of the social sciences.
2. A. KRONMAN, MAx WaBR (1983) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
1386
Max Weber
meaning by positing values. Although individuals can be joined recipro-
cally in social action, positing can only be done by persons as individuals,
each existentially choosing what to believe. In his own beliefs, a man is
autonomous: free to choose among existing values or free to choose new
values. The will is the organ of this autonomy and creativity.
Kronman attributes to Weber the Kantian view that the will determines
action in accordance with a rule.' Since he maintains that Weber under-
stands reason or "rationality" primarily to mean governed by rules or
"principles,"'4 it follows that the will is necessarily related to reason. Yet
there are many different kinds of rules and hence different kinds of ra-
tionality. While they all involve "control by the intellect," not all involve a
"systematic," "gapless and internally consistent body of rules," and not all
involve the "abstract or logical interpretation of meaning. ' 5 There is no
one, objective reason. Since Weber's work explores the meanings and ori-
gins of qualitatively different forms of rationality, it can be called a sociol-
ogy of rationalisms.8
B. Four Types of Legal Reasoning
The sociology of law details four basic types of legal thought, two of
which Weber calls "rational" and two "irrational." Within the categories
of the "rational" and the "irrational," he introduces a further distinction
between "formal" and "substantive" characteristics. "Formal" can mean
"governed by general rules or principles" as well as the "self-
containedness" of those rules, their independence from considerations ex-
ternal to the system. Formal rules are calculable-they can predict events.
This feature is important to a model of man as an individual who can
plan and control his life." "Substantive" rules, in contrast, focus on partic-
ular values and/or certain practical procedures in decisionmaking. Legal
systems, then, are either "formally irrational," "substantively irrational,"
"substantively rational," or "formally rational."'
3. Pp. 20 n.**, 141, 143-45.
4. P. 73; see 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 655 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978).
5. Pp. 73-75.
6. Cf. C. ANrTONI, FROM HISTORY TO SOCIOLOGY 161 (H. White trans. 1959) (Weber's studies
in the economic ethics of world religions are contribution to a "sociology of rationalism").
7. P. 94.
8. Pp. 75-78. Kronman's examples of each are: (1) formally irrational-using means that cannot
be controlled by the intellect, such as an oracle, to decide cases; formality consists in the definite rules
detailing how questions are posed to the oracle; (2) substantively irrational-using ad hoc adjudication
by a judge, such as a Moslem Khadi or an English justice of the peace, who directly applies not only
legal but also ethical, emotional, or political values in his evaluation of the concrete factors of each
case; (3) substantively rational-applying a general, non-legal ethical principle, such as a moral im-
perative or a utilitarian rule, to all cases falling under it, as in priestly or theocratic legal systems; and
(4) formally rational-using general abstract legal principles into which every concrete situation is
fitted by means of logic internal to the legal system itself, as in modem civil codes based on Roman
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Since he defines both rationality and formality as rule-governed, three
of the four types-the two kinds of rationality and "formal irrational-
ity"-are rule-governed. Three of the four types of law can therefore con-
tribute to modern social practices, such as capitalism and bureaucracy,
which require calculable rules. The remaining type, "substantive irration-
ality," is not governed by a rule, except insofar as rules specify who may
perform ad hoc adjudication.
Kronman clarifies distinctions among these types and explains why they
have often been confused. This clarification is important, for it has often
been difficult to distinguish between Weber's first and third types, "for-
mally irrational" and "substantively rational" legal thought. Each type
occurs in systems of justice most characteristic of pre-modern legal sys-
tems, in which decisions are not made on the basis of general and self-
contained rules. By showing that Weber is trying to discuss three distinct
variables within the confines of only two linked pairs of terms,9 Kronman
clears up a long-standing confusion between the two types.
So far, Weber is a relativist: He sees no preferred form of reason but
rather a variety of equally valid ways of conceiving legal rules. Yet
Kronman wants to argue that one mode of legal thought, formal rational-
ity, is particularly privileged in Weber's system. To see why he thinks
this, we must consider the place of formally rational thought in political
authority relations.
C. Political Authority Relations
Political authority relations, like legal relations, are instances of social
action, in which the "subjective meaning [of a person's behavior] takes
account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course."10
In relations of pure power, the subjective meaning of a person's behavior
takes account of the fact that he is going to be coerced by someone else,
and this knowledge provides the entire meaning of his behavior. In rela-
tions of political authority, people assent to government if they believe the
powers of the rulers to be justified or legitimate. Rulers possess both the
means of coercion and the means of legitimation. Political systems can
law.
9. Pp. 79-80. The two linked pairs of terms are: (1) formal and substantive; (2) rational and
irrational. The three variables are: (l) the nature of the rules: general versus particularistic; (2) the
evidentiary basis of the decisions: logical interpretation of meaning versus adherence to external char-
acteristics of sense-data; and (3) the self-containedness of the system: whether it draws a distinction
between legal and extra-legal norms. We can now see that "formally irrational" law uses particularis-
tic procedures with reference to empirical data for its decisions; "substantively rational" law may use
fixed extra-legal principles referring to facts and casuistry to connect those principles, but it does not
use the logical analysis of meaning characteristic of formal rationality.
10. 1 M. WFBER, ECONOMY AND Socwry 4 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978).
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embody, and people can believe in, one of several different kinds of legiti-
macy. The modern type is legal-rational authority, in which individuals
believe that political rulers are legitimate because they have been empow-
ered to follow a body of intentionally enacted, abstract rules."" Kronman
argues that this form of authority occupies a privileged position because it
alone accords with Weber's general philosophical position, which presup-
poses the idea of an autonomous will able to choose what rules to live by.
The autonomous will as the basis of political obligation contrasts with
two other types of legitimacy, which Kronman links to corresponding
philosophical positions on the relation between facts and values."2 The
first contrast is to the non-autonomous will characteristic of "tradition," in
which legitimacy is accorded to political rulers because they have previ-
ously been rulers; here, value flows from historical fact." Kronman ar-
gues that tradition implies not only that social practices have previously
been done this way but that they have always been done this way; hence
tradition involves a kind of teleological behaviorism in which the valuable
grows out of the biologically natural.1 4 (I do not see why this necessarily
follows, for tradition could have an historical origin.) The second main
version of the non-autonomous will occurs in the legitimacy of "cha-
risma," in which people assent to a leadei whom they believe to be graced
by the will of God. Their wills are thus subordinated to revelation, and so
the inherent meaning of facts-such as people's desires and certain signs
of the prophet's powers-may be said to flow from the values of a divinely
inspired will.15 Throughout this discussion, Kronman reminds us that
Weber thinks that all three types of authority are artificial creations of
autonomous human wills. The difference between them is that only the
first is acknowledged as such by the actors involved; hence people in the
other systems live without self-consciousness."'
Early in Economy and Society, Weber mentions a fourth type of author-
ity relation, though Kronman says its sense is "unclear."1 " I think it plays
a role in Weber's thought that cannot be neglected. This type of political
legitimacy is based on "value-rationality," which we can now understand
as akin to "substantively rational" legal thought. In both, there is an au-
tonomous will, yet one that conforms to the rule of reason. This is the




14. See pp. 57-58, 60, 67; cf. p. 24 (discussing teleological explanations).
15. Pp. 69-71.
16. Pp. 54-55, 68.
17. P. 44 n.*.
18. See T. AQUINAS, I-II SUMMA THEOLOGmCA Q. 94; cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
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since it is towards a human, not an animal, purpose. 9 Political authority
based on "value-rationality" imports values, such as moral equality and
goodness, from outside the legal system.2 0 It is also based on a value gen-
erated from within the legal system of constitutional republics itself: the
value of citizenship.
21
Weber thinks that a fifth type of authority relation, charisma inverted
in an anti-authoritarian direction, also characterizes modern mass democ-
racy.22 Though Kronman does not mention this type, its nature partially
supports his interpretation. With this fifth type, value becomes lodged in a
multiplicity of wills, in the people who are empowered to elect-and
hence confer recognition upon-their charismatic leaders. We might even
say that charisma itself has been reclaimed by the people. But the ques-
tion then arises, how does one go from an autonomous will to a collection
of autonomous wills all following the same rule in a common or a general
will? In other words, is Weber a social contractarian?
D. Contract as an Expression of the Autonomous Will
Kronman argues that modern legal contracts-private ones and, by im-
plication, the hypothetical public contract-are key political instruments
in Weber's philosophy, since they provide the primary vehicle for the ex-
pression of the autonomous will.2" He bases this assertion on Weber's
distinction between "status contracts," which are thought to have charac-
terized pre-modern times, and the "purposive contracts" characteristic of
the modern age. Whereas an individual formerly contracted into an entire
new status or ethical personality, the individual now enters a contract for
discrete ends and retains his formally free, legal personality throughout
and outside the relationship. 4 Kronman thus claims that "purposive con-
tracts" have a central place in Weber's thought because only through such
instruments can an individual express his "bare power or capacity . . .
for purposeful action itself" while maintaining a "core identity" outside
the contract.25 The individual self-consciously and freely assents to a rule
with one, two, or many others.
LAW 181-95 (1961) (discussing natural law and presenting a theory of its "minimum content").
19. Cf. ARISTOTLE, POLTICS 1252al5-1253a38 (man by nature intended to live and develop his
faculties in polis). On teleological rationality in Weber, see Loewith, Weber's Interpretation of the
Bourgeois-Capitalistic World in Terms of the Guiding Principle of "Rationalization," in MAX
WEBER 101, 112 (D. Wrong ed. 1970).
20. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 866-73 (discussing relevance of moral values external to legal
system).
21. See infra pp. 1391-1392.
22. 1 M. WEBER supra note 10, at 266-67.
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Kronman also argues that the most concrete embodiment of legal per-
sonality is the right of ownership; it is the basic entitlement rule which
signifies that a person is not a thing but rather a being free to appropriate
and to alienate things.2" In this he is following Hegel,2 7 but he does not
establish why Weber would necessarily take this step. I do not think that
Weber would require that the definition of a free person include his being
able to own property. Weber's notion of human freedom is more spiritual,
and does not require material realization: A man can be free if he believes
in certain projects he has chosen.
Were ownership the basic entitlement rule in a society based on the
autonomous will, citizenship would also have to be conceived as owner-
ship-ownership in the res publica, the public thing or place. While this
is Marx's understanding of citizenship, it is not Weber's.28 In his analysis
of the ancient city-state and in his prefiguration of communist society,
Marx requires that the individual be considered as an owner of the
sources of political power. 9 Weber, in contrast, conceives of citizenship as
a relation of association, not appropriation. His long analysis in The City
treats citizenship as a contractual relation not easily classified in either
"status" or "purposive" terms.
Kronman might argue that, in ancient and medieval times, citizenship
was a status contract of a special legal community, which Weber thinks
has been superseded in the purposive contract of the liberal state.30 But to
talk about a state assumes the existence of national political boundaries,
yet the logic of the will-centered theory leads to a universal world state. Is
the existence of a political community predicated solely on its origins and
on the enforcement problems that are entailed in Weber's definitions of
law and the state? Or is it rather required by the very meaning of citizen-
ship itself, which grows out of a non-will-centered theory and continues to
have that significance? In this latter view, "modern" individuals enter into
26. Pp. 141, 144 n.357.
27. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 41-53 (T.M. Knox trans. 1952).
28. I argue this more fully in Schwartz, Communitarian Citizenship: Marx and Weber on the
City, POLITY (forthcoming in Spring 1985).
29. See K. MARX, PRE-CAPITALIST ECONOMIC FORMATIONS (J. Cohen trans. 1965); K. MARX,
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND
SoctiET (L. Easton & K. Guddat eds. 1967). For Marx, man's freedom consists in the ability to
appropriate, to make the world one's own by fashioning it according to one's (individual and collec-
tive) will through the transformational activity of labor upon nature. Weber has a very different
model of man and of human freedom, which does not depend upon man's interaction with nature.
Freedom has more to do with man's interaction with spirit-that is, with choosing one's ultimate
values.
30. Kronman does mention, p. 46, that citizenship involves membership in an organization as a
precondition to the citizen's assuming rights and duties. But he does not show how the idea of mem-
bership, in some respects a non-voluntaristic notion, fits in with a will-centered theory. For sugges-
tions as to how it might, see Mosher, Civic Identity in the Juridical Society: On Hegelianisn as
Discipline for the Romantic Mind,'11 PoL. THEORY 117 (1983).
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"pre-modern" fraternization relations, considering each other symbolic
brothers and having certain unlimited obligations as members, but at the
same time they know that they are also individual proprietors pursuing
diverse purposes in their non-political lives.31 They are thus fully self-
conscious, but they acknowledge that they are not fully autonomous wills.
To reverse a metaphor used in the sociology of religion, the citizen be-
comes a "vessel," not a "tool": The fellowship of association is an end in
itself, to be passively received and enjoyed, not solely to be used for instru-
mental advantage. (Note that we are talking about the meaning of citizen-
ship and not about its historical origins.) There is, for example, the in-
credible wistfulness on the last page of The City, where Weber describes
the dialectical contests of Greek life: In war, in speech, in sports, "even
the loincloth fell away." 2 The nudity of the gymnasium is neither a re-
turn to natural, spontaneous emotion nor a situation characterized by the
will as "the self's 'point of gravity.' "" It is the result of a disciplined
education of the emotions into a mode of beauty, based on a different
theory of the soul. In the environment characterized by Socratic knowl-
edge, which Kronman superbly contrasts to what he sees as Weber's posi-
tion, greater importance is accorded to the parts of the soul-the passions
and the intellect-which are thought to surround the will. Socrates as-
sumes that reason can come to teach the passions, that there is such a
thing as right reason, and that there can be less need for the will. Maybe
Kronman is correct that Weber, in his explicit pronouncements on
method, insists on the primacy of the will, but surely there is also a strong
yearning in Weber's comparative writings for the synthesis, which natural
law promises, of "gravity and grace."'"
I want to suggest that Weber's belief in the will's autonomy must be
seen in the context of an equally strong belief in the "givenness of things."
The individual will exists in a social situation not of its choosing or crea-
tion. 5 These social contexts do not come to have meaning because we
choose them-they have meaning first, and then we choose them. While it
is important to say, as Kronman does, that Weber believes that our value
choices are not determined, it is equally important to say that, for Weber,
our choices are situated in interpretive contexts which are historically
given.
36
31. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 1241-50 (discussing city as fraternal association), 1321-30
(discussing city as a context within which burghers pursued their own economic interests).
32. Id. at 1368.
33. P. 156.
34. I take this phrase from S. WmL, GRAVrrY AND GRACE (A. Wills trans. 1952).
35. Kronman briefly acknowledges this, p. 21, but does not examine its implications.
36. On "situated freedom," see C. TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOCIETY 154-66 (1979).
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II. CONSTRAINTS ON THE WILL
A. Charisma and Its Routinization
Weber's theory of the will, then, lies embedded in a larger philosophy,
one which is perhaps teleological and which is certainly historical. He
sought to explain how the modern world's meanings had developed, seek-
ing "the causes of their being historically so and not otherwise."' 7 Weber's
attention to history and causality must be accorded its place in any overall
characterization of his philosophy.
The role of past charisma and its routinization in constituting present
meanings must especially be acknowledged. Charisma, which appears un-
expectedly and is recognized by others in persons of exceptional will and
spirit, determines the shape and meaning of social systems. Charisma con-
tinually yet fortuitously provides earthly centers of symbolic meaning, to
which all other social actors desire access.38 These social systems of new
meaning are then inherited as given.
Kronman discusses charismatic authority only briefly, primarily in
terms of its instability, its tendency to change into traditional or rational-
legal authority." The charismatic prophet "has the power to interpret
[the] meaning [of his prophetic gift] and hence to decide the scope of his
own mission." °40 Yet Kronman does not explore the ways in which the
charismatic origins of social systems persist as the parameters of later
meaning. Moses receives the tablets of the Law at Sinai; he comes down
from the mountain and his charismatic authority is codified into countless
rules. But the original Decalogue still sets the basic interpretive terms.
B. The Role of Force
Kronman also underplays Weber's discussion of violence. In every
Weberian definition of a system of secular social relations, whether it be
law, politics, or economics, there is an element of external force in addi-
tion to the element of internal belief. While Kronman is right to argue
that the exciting part of Weber's interpretive sociology involves showing
that people's ideas and beliefs significantly influence and cause their ac-
tions, it does a disservice to Weber as an explanatory sociologist to ignore
the role of force. Since people acknowledge this role, the expectation of
37. M. WEBER, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 72 (E. Shils & H. Finch eds. 1949)(enphasis in original).
38. Eisenstadt, Introduction, in MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INsTrruTION BUILDING xxx-
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violence becomes one element, though not the sole one, in people's subjec-
tive meanings.
Weber's definition of law includes both the internal aspect of belief (le-
gitimacy) and the external aspect of coercion (force): "An order will be
called. . . law if it is externally guaranteed by the probability that physi-
cal or psychological coercion will be applied by a staff of people in order
to bring about compliance or avenge violation."4 Law specifies certain
legal relationships, which "designate that situation in which the content of
a right is constituted by a relationship, i.e., the actual or potential actions
of concrete persons or of persons to be identified by concrete criteria."42 In
any system of legal coercion, the norms specifying the rights are then said
to be "formally accepted as binding. ' 43 When the norms are violated, the
staff goes into action, enforcement occurring "for the norm's sake,"
44
though enforcement is usually not needed. Nonetheless, "[t]his apparatus
must also possess such power that there is in fact a significant probability
that the norm will be respected because of the possibility of recourse to
such legal coercion."' 4" The existence, or what Weber calls the "empirical
validity," of a legal order stems from this probability.
Kronman says that Weber's definition of a legal system as a system of
norms backed up by an enforcement staff is arbitrary, and might have
been defined differently had Weber wanted, for example, to treat modern
enacted law as the only real law, thereby excluding pre-modern forms of
law.46 Kronman also cites one passage which gives a more "consensual"
interpretation to the coercive element.47 But given Weber's general politi-
cal philosophy, he has to include an element of coercion in his initial defi-
nition, even if it raises troublesome questions for the freedom of the will.
In any event, the initial definition of law is the most useful sociologically.
By including the idea of legal norms, Weber can explore the internal dy-
namic of a legal system in its own development, rather than merely con-
sidering it as the result of other conditions. To speak only of legal norms
would leave those ideas unconnected to their source (the legal elite) and
their recipients (the people); it would ignore the rules' relation to "mate-
41. 1 M. WEBER, supra note 10, at 34 (emphasis in original). Weber's famous definition of the
state as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical
force within a given territory," M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 78 (H.
Gerth & C.W. Mills eds. 1958) (emphasis in original), includes both aspects of internal belief (legiti-
macy) and external coercion (physical force).
42. 1 M. WEBER, supra note 10, at 319.
43. Id. at 313.
44. Id.
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rial and ideal interests."4 To speak only of a system of enforcement
would mean that constant vigilance was required by that staff.
C. The Will in Modern Social Relations
Kronman argues that the model of man implicit in Weber's analysis of
the formal rationality of the law also underlies the significance of the
other main modern social practices: economic relations, administrative or-
ganization, and political authority. The idea of man as a will who enters
into purposive legal contracts is the essence of the meaning of capitalism,49
impersonal bureaucracy, and rational-legal authority. Kronman offers his
argument as one about analogous meanings, not about causality, and
about logical, not ethical, significance. In considering it, we must ask
whether the separation of the three enterprises-interpretation, explana-
tion, and assessment-has been maintained, and whether they have been
successfully integrated. These questions are important, for Weber wanted
the sociology of law to be not only exegetical, but also to explain how
different systems of law evolved.50
On the level of meaning, Kronman shows that the will-centered legal
theory has a tight, although not a unique, fit with capitalism. Capitalism
is based on private ownership of the means of production and a free mar-
ket of changeable contracts; its rationalization involves the use of formally
rational legal instruments such as the laws of agency, negotiable instru-
ments, and incorporation. The capitalist firm has the unlimited end of
production for profit, in contrast to the household economy, where pro-
duction has the limited end of use. In capitalist accounting, the end is in
principle quantitatively indeterminate-"more"-and qualitatively inde-
terminate as long as meeting new needs increases profit. Profit-seeking
entrepreneurs thus express autonomy of the will-if we understand this
as freedom to choose among alternatives-and possibly also creativity of
the will-if one accepts the one constraint of "profit" which defines the
economic sphere itself.51 Weber acknowledges two irrationalities that im-
pede the operation of capitalism's formal rationality as a system which
actualizes individual autonomy. Kronman seems to believe that society can
48. Cf M. WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAx WEBER, supra
note 41, at 280 (discussing ways in which "material and ideal interests" directly govern men's
conduct)..
49. Socialism shares with capitalism the idea of man as a legally free person with rights and
entitlements; however, in mandating that the worker shall own the means of production and be enti-
tled to his job, it departs from the ideal of free and changeable contracts. Pp. 144-46.
50. Cf Fay & Moon, What Would An Adequate Philosophy of Social Science Look Like?, 7 PHin.
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remedy one of these, the unequal distribution of property, without dis-
carding the system's formal rationality.52 But he suggests that the other
constraint on autonomy, extreme discipline and specialization in the divi-
sion of labor, is irremediable under formal rationality.5"
Kronman's argument that the autonomous will is the underlying mean-
ing of bureaucracy is less convincing. Although it is true that, in both
private contracts and bureaucratic office holding, an individual voluntarily
decides to enter a contract characterized by formal rationality, the bureau-
crat can neither set the rules nor change them. Indeed, his freedom is so
limited because his position meets another of Weber's criteria of the mod-
ern social order: separation of the spheres of life, and hence non-
ownership of his job. Since the bureaucrat has no entitlement to that posi-
tion, he lacks the control which ownership brings. In private bureaucracy,
the organization is owned by the stockholders and their board of directors.
In public bureaucracy, the civil servant's office is owned, as it were, by
the politician; the government sets and changes the rules by its deliberate
enactments.54
Does this political rule partake of legal rationality? Only if one allows
both categories of legal rationality-formal and substantive-into the pic-
ture. Legislation cannot go in any direction; it must include certain sub-
stantive, natural law preconditions, such as the notion of moral equality.55
Moreover, the legislators themselves have certain special qualities, of
courage and passion, which "must owe their existence to some aspect of a
person's character-some part of his soul-other than the will."'  Politi-
cal leaders need these qualities not only in relation to their followers, in
setting examples and exhorting sacrifice, but also in their own deliberate
enactment of legislation. Thus, part of the public law's legitimacy in a
rational-legal system comes from something beyond its being the product
of autonomous wills. Legitimacy also issues from the past actions of the
people's representatives, who were wise, courageous, and passionate. Or
52. See Kronman, Contract Lau, and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980). But cf. p.
173 (lack of resources transforms capitalism's formal freedom into "iron cage" guaranteeing "the
preservation of existing disparities in wealth").
53. Pp. 171-72.
54. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 1407-08, 1416-17 (importance of parliamentary control of
bureaucracy).
55. Equality before the law involves a substantive precondition derived from the Christian natural
law belief that the spirit of God resides in every man. Kronman derives equality from within secular
reason, in the concept that every human being has, in principle, the rational capacity to understand a
rule. Pp. 141-43. Yet are people really equal in that respect? How simple must the rule be to say that
all people can in principle conceive it? Hart, for example, does not think that all citizens can under-
stand the secondary rules of recognition, adjudication, and change which he thinks characterize a legal
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foolish and feckless. Either way, there is an historical element to the law,
as there is to a human life, which contributes to its meaning.
D. Political History in Weber's Theory of Law
Kronman's only chapter on causal explanation ignores the presence in
Weber's work of a political history, or a sociology of political factors,
which affects the shape and hence the meaning of the law. The chapter is
cast in very general terms: whether capitalism caused the rise of modern
law or vice versa and, even more abstractly, whether ideas influence mate-
rial forces or vice versa. On these questions, Kronman labels Weber a
"causal agnostic," implying both that one does not know the answer to
these questions and one could not know.
Weber uses two main examples of the development of law and capital-
ism. In continental Europe, formally rational law, such as later Roman
and canon law, fit best with capitalism, while in England, the first coun-
try to experience capitalist development, the common law had many for-
mally irrational elements.57 While showing that the meaning of English
common law can also fit with capitalism, because of the calculability that
results from its formality, Kronman skirts the question of causation. He
ignores the kinds of factors-for example, political conflict between a
leader and his administritive staff58-that Weber characteristically uses to
explain historical change.
In The Sociology of Law, Weber seeks to explain how it was that En-
glish common law developed the way it did, and he finds political factors
to have been crucial. The paths followed by different bodies of law "de-
pended largely upon factors of legal technique and of political organiza-
tion. Economic factors can therefore be said to have had an indirect influ-
ence only." 59 Weber makes this point at the beginning of The Sociology of
Law, and returns to it toward the end:
The differences between Continental and Common Law methods
of legal thought have been produced mostly by factors which are re-
spectively connected with the internal structure and the modes of ex-
istence of the legal profession as well as by factors related to differ-
ences in political development. The economic elements, however,
have been determinative only in connection with these elements.60
He suggests that the internal structure of the legal profession is itself also
57. Pp. 89, 120-24.
58. 1 M. WEBRit, supra note 10, at 264.
59. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 654-55.
60. Id. at 889-90.
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"largely dependent upon political factors.""1 The key political question is
how the leader maintains his power in relation to the relevant political
and social groups, one of which is the legal profession.2 Two political
conditions-the degree of "political centralization" and "the autonomous
development of the respective structures of domination [author-
ity]"-account for the differences between England's and Germany's sys-
tems of law.6
To reintroduce the question of causality into the sociology of law is to
raise questions of historical origins which then constrain and shape the
will, while to stress political power and political value conflicts as the
decisive causal factors is to suggest that political purposes and norms are
more central to humans than are nonpolitical goals. If we take seriously
the claim that Weber is a philosopher, then there is significance in the fact
that he chose to do philosophy through the medium of political sociology.
61. Id. at 883.
62. These passages would require elaboration before one had a set of causal propositions about
how a legal system in a particular nation came into being. The form of these propositions might be
"quasi-causal," that is, they would not be general laws of a covering law type; rather, they would
specify particular kinds of factors which are inferred to have become meaningful reasons for the
actions of individuals and groups. Here, Weber suggests that access to political power has been a
crucial consideration motivating the action of legal elites. On the methodological issue, see Moon, The
Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives, in I HANDBOOK OF POL. SCIENCE
182-91 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 1975); Moon, Understanding and Explanation in Social
Science: On Runciman's Critique of Weber, 5 POL. THEORY 183, 190-91 (1977).
63. 2 M. WEBER, supra note 4, at 977 (emphasis in original).
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Increasing Our Effectiveness Against
Crime: Expanding the Limits of Law
Enforcement
The Limits of Law Enforcement. By Hans Zeisel. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xv, 245. $20.00.
Charles H. Whitebreadt and John Heilmant
I.
Any book written by Hans Zeisel must be taken seriously. After all,
Professor Zeisel has been one of the dominant figures in criminal justice
since his work with Harry Kalven, Jr. on the American jury revolution-
ized academic thought about the workings of juries.' In his most recent
book, The Limits of Law Enforcement,2 Professor Zeisel attempts to have
the same impact upon the study of criminology.
Professor Zeisel's basic thesis is that the criminal justice system, and
law enforcement in particular, cannot alone solve the problem of crime in
American society. He concludes that the power of law enforcement to con-
trol crime is "unexpectedly small; law enforcement is unable to reduce
significantly our high rate of crime."' According to Professor Zeisel, solv-
ing the crime problem in America requires that our society look at factors
other than law enforcement itself because law enforcement is unable to
respond to the well-known causes of crime: unemployment, poverty, and
poor education.'
Professor Zeisel, of course, is correct in pointing out that law enforce-
t George T. Pfleger Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center.
t Attorney, Taylor, Roth & Hunt, Los Angeles; Secretary, American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California.
The authors are greatly indebted to the contributions of Harris M. Miller II, a third-year law
student at the University of Southern California Law Center, and to the assistance of John Hasko,
research librarian at the University of Southern California Law Center.
1. H. ZEisF.L & H. KALVEN, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). Hans Zeisel is professor emeritus of
law and sociology at the University of Chicago Law School. His other books include H. ZEISEL,
DELAY IN THE COURT (1959); H. ZESEL, M. JAHODA & P. LAZARSFELD, MARIENTHAL: THE
SOCIOGRAPHY OF AN UNEMPLOYED COMMUNITY (1971); and H. ZELSEL, SAY IT wrrH FIGURas
(1947).
2. H. ZEISEL, THE LIMrrs OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (1982) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
3. P. 4.
4. See pp. 83-88.
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ment's ability to have an impact on crime is limited. His work, however,
is flawed by several significant analytical problems. First, Professor Zeisel
ignores the fact that law enforcement can have a significant impact on
crime if we as a society are willing to forgo our civil liberties and submit
to armed force to control conduct. He also ignores that, even short of a
police state, law enforcement's effectiveness against crime can be increased
by better police training, rule-oriented decisionmaking, and reconsidera-
tion of our treatment of crimes committed by those who know their vic-
tims. For these reasons, Professor Zeisel's conclusion that "law enforce-
ment . ..cannot by itself significantly reduce crime"5 is too sweeping,
especially in light of the statistical data employed by Zeisel.
Despite these difficulties, The Limits of Law Enforcement, and the Vera
Institute Study on which it is based,' are important contributions to re-
search on criminal justice. The Vera Institute and Professor Zeisel studied
dispositions of felony arrests in New York City in 1972 and 1973 to de-
termine why most such arrests resulted in dismissals or "deteriorated"
into lesser charges. Professor Zeisel supports his conclusions on the inef-
fectiveness of law enforcement with a number of different findings from
this survey of arrests.
Lack of cooperation from the complaining witness was one of the most
important reasons for deterioration and dismissal of felony charges." Some
of the complaining witnesses had undoubtedly been intimidated by their
assailants, but in most cases the reason for the deterioration or dismissal
of charges was that the complaining witness had a longstanding relation-
ship with the accused and did not want to proceed with criminal
prosecution."
Other important reasons for dismissal and deterioration of felony
charges included the lack of credibility of the complaining witness, the fact
that the arrest was for a first offense, or the absence of criminal intent.'
Professor Zeisel's work with Vera thus puts to rest the common concep-
5. P. 15.
6. VERA INST., FELONY ARRESTS, THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN NEw YORK
CITY'S COURTS (1977). Professor Zeisel participated in the Vera Institute study and the data he uses
in his book were previously reported by the Institute. In The Limits of Law Enforcenent, however,
Professor Zeisel organizes the data more comprehensively, making use of his statistical ability to pre-
sent numerous, superbly informative charts and graphs.
7. Pp. 26-27; VERA INST., supra note 6, at 19-20.
8. Pp. 114-19. The Vera Institute's study found that the proportion of criminal defendants who
knew their victims ranged from a low of 21% in auto theft arrests to a high of 83% in rape cases.
VERA INST., supra note 6, at 19 Table D. Robbers knew their victims in 36% of the robbery arrests,
and burglars knew their victims in 39% of the burglary arrests. Id. These statistics were consistent
with the figures found in B. FORST, J. LUCIANOVIC, S. Cox, WHAT HAPPENS AFTER ARREST? 24
(1977); see also C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 257-77 (1978) (citing
Vera Institute figures indicating that victims' reluctance to cooperate with prosecution because of prior
relationship with arrestee is one reason for reduction and dismissal of charges).
9. Pp. 109-12.
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tion that institutional restraints within the system of criminal justice, such
as a shortage of prosecutors or court congestion, account for most dismis-
sals and reductions in charges. For the most part, nonevidentiary circum-
stances seldom result in reductions of felony charges.10
Professor Zeisel therefore concludes11 that, regardless of what law en-
forcement does, it cannot significantly increase the number of arrests
which result in convictions: "Barring radical changes in the size and
structure of the police force, it cannot do much better than it now does."12
More law enforcement will not, says Professor Zeisel, significantly reduce
our high crime rate."
These conclusions, however, are not a call to anarchy: "If we are seri-
ous in our concern over crime, we must look elsewhere for relief."'1  Those
who have long looked to better education, reduced unemployment, or bet-
ter housing as the solutions to high crime rates1" will clearly find Profes-
sor Zeisel's conclusions appealing. There are, however, a number of
problems with Professor Zeisel's work that call into question the reliabil-
ity of his data and his conclusions.
II.
One of Professor Zeisel's major problems is his use of conviction data as
a measure of law enforcement's effectiveness in combating crime. Al-
though conviction rates are good measures of how law enforcement is re-
sponding to crimes that have occurred and been reported, Professor Zeisel
does not clearly establish why conviction rates indicate anything about law
enforcement's ability to prevent criminal activity altogether. He asserts
that "law enforcement begins to function when it has failed[:] . . . after a
crime has been reported to the police."'" But this oversimplification ig-
nores the fact that the very existence of law enforcement has a deterrent
effect on crime,"7 and this deterrent effect is not necessarily related to the
number of convictions per arrest.
Arrest itself, regardless of outcome, subjects the arrestee to considerable
10. P. 109.
11. Professor Zeisel actually presents his conclusions in a long first chapter which summarizes




15. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 35-38 (1967) (war on poverty, inadequate housing, and
unemployment is war on crime) [hereinafter cited as COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT).
16. P. 15.
17. See Wycoff & Manning, The Police and Crime Control, in EVALUATING PERFORMANCE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 15 (G. Whitaker & C. Phillips eds. 1983) (Sage Criminal Justice
System Annuals vol. no. 19).
1401
The Yale Law Journal
hardship, some potential loss of liberty, and tremendous economic loss.18
In a drug arrest in which the police seize two ounces of cocaine in an
illegal search, for example, the police win a smashing victory even if the
case is never filed or is dismissed after a successful motion to suppress the
illegally seized evidence. The police have (i) removed the cocaine from the
street; (ii) caused a terrific economic loss to the seller; (iii) required the
arrestee to pay an attorney a non-refundable fee; and (iv) either forced the
arrestee to pay a bondsman or kept the arrestee off the streets for several
days if he cannot readily post bond. Interestingly, the arrest may also
alienate the arrestee from his friends and collaborators if they suspect that
he has become a police informant to gain the dismissal. All told, the police
power to arrest is a tremendous deterrent to crime whatever the outcome
of the case.
In addition, police may deter crime without resort to arrest. Areas pa-
trolled regularly and visibly by uniformed police may see substantial
short-term reductions of criminal activity.19 Indeed, the police power to
accost potential troublemakers and banish them from a particular area,
while undeniably beyond the constitutional ideal, may have a very potent
deterrent effect.20 And, as in the case of the deterrent effects of simple
arrests, these exercises of police discretion on the street are not necessarily
related to the number of convictions that a police agency can obtain.
Professor Zeisel might have argued that, as conviction rates fall, the
deterrent effect of law enforcement diminishes because criminals believe
they are less likely to be convicted.21 While such an argument might have
some merit, Professor Zeisel never makes this or any other argument to
show that conviction rates are a true measure of law enforcement's effect
on crime.
Moreover, Professor Zeisel's conclusion is too broad even if one as-
sumes that conviction rates are accurate measures of police impact on
crime. He argues that police cannot significantly reduce crime even with
18. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 447 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arrest
"abruptly subjects a person to constraint and removes him to unfamiliar and threatening
surroundings").
19. See PoLIcE FOUND., THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (1981); Police Foot Patrols
Reduced Crime Says Flint, Michigan Project, 13 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Sept. 27, 1982, at 3-4;
Kelling, Return of the Foot Patrol: Maybe Patrol Cars Respond Faster, But The Cop on the Beat Has
Psychological Value, L.A. Daily Journal, Aug. 4, 1983, at 4, col. 3. For a typical response to foot
patrols in a medium-sized city, see Police Patrols Curbing Downtown Problems, The Sedalia Demo-
crat, June 3, 1978, at 8A.
20. See generally Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983)
(discussing constitutionality of police detentions where race is factor in decision to detain).
21. For discussion of this argument, see Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE
L.J. 209 (1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 Am. ECON. REv. 397 (1975); Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Erhlich and His
Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 (1975).
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greater resources. 2 What he should have said, however, is that police can-
not significantly reduce crime at a price that we as a society are willing to
pay.
Although Professor Zeisel seems to presuppose that society is unwilling
to sacrifice our individual rights and freedoms for a totalitarian state al-
most free of crime, such an assumption might unfortunately be wrong.
Recent initiatives for criminal "reform" in various states indicate that so-
ciety, or at least many in this society, will trade certain procedural protec-
tions for a perceived reduction in crime. 3 Similarly, recent legislative pro-
posals in Congress indicate that our nation's leaders are willing to restrict
the use of the writ of habeas corpus, 4 limit the availability of bail,2 5 and
permit the introduction of illegally seized evidence in criminal proceed-
ings.2" Thus, Professor Zeisel's implicit assumption that our society is not
willing to give up various constitutional protections in exchange for a re-
duced crime rate is not necessarily correct, and his conclusion should have
been limited accordingly.
Professor Zeisel should have also limited his conclusions to the long-
range effectiveness of law enforcement over a large area. Contrary to his
sweeping conclusion, law enforcement can reduce crime in a restricted
area over a restricted period of time. For example, law enforcement offi-
cials frequently launch campaigns to reduce prostitution in certain areas
for a limited period of time. These campaigns are often successful.27 Simi-
larly, the police response to the May Day demonstrations in Washington,
D.C., in 1971 presents another example of the tremendous impact that
law enforcement can have over the short run.28 Thousands of protesters
against the war in Vietnam descended on the Capital simultaneously. The
police arrested huge numbers of people and detained them in the city's
stadium and in other very large holding facilities. The mass arrests effec-
tively ended the protest and prevented the demonstrators from engaging in
what the police feared would be criminal conduct..2  The cases against the
22. See pp. 83-84.
23. See Making Criminals Pay, L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 27, 1982, at 4, col. 1. In California, for
example, voters recently approved a so-called "Victims' Bill of Rights." New California Anti-Crime
Measure Clouds Criminal Justice System, 13 CRIM. JUsT. NEWSL rE R, June 21, 1982, at 3. This
initiative, Proposition 8, amended the California state constitution to provide for preventive detention
and other limits on the right to bail, lengthier sentences for repeat offenders, fewer defenses, and a
reduction in plea bargaining. L.A. Daily Journal, May 21, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
24. S. 1763, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
25. S. 215, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
26. S. 1764, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
27. Of course, over time in a given community, these efforts are not really successful. The prosti-
tution or other crime either shifts to a different area or returns when "the heat is off." N.Y. Times,
May 6, 1971, at Al, col. 1.
28. Id. at A38, col. 1.
29. Actually, the police themselves engaged in criminal activity by illegally arresting and detaining
citizens. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1981, at A32, col. 1.
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demonstrators were abandoned," yet law enforcement had a tremendous
effect on the short-term ability of the protestors to engage in criminal be-
havior. Professor Zeisel should have at least acknowledged law enforce-
ment's short-term effect.
Professor Zeisel also should have made a more convincing argument as
to why his data, gathered in New York, are applicable nationwide. He
notes that large American cities, including New York City, have relatively
similar rates of convictions per number of arrests."1 From this he con-
cludes that New York City is similar to other American cities in terms of
law enforcement's effect on crime.3 2
Professor Zeisel's conclusion is flawed, however, because it takes into
account only arrests and convictions, not reported crimes. For example,
both New York and Cleveland may have about one hundred convictions
for every five hundred arrests.33 However, if New York has only twenty
arrests for every thousand reported crimes, but the ratio in Cleveland is
200:1000, then it is not appropriate to use New York's data as any indica-
tion of the effectiveness of law enforcement in Cleveland.
3 4
Moreover, Professor Zeisel's reliance on New York City data is partic-
ularly strange given that his own statistics indicate, for example, that the
conviction rate in New York City is nearly eighteen percent higher than
that in New Orleans. 5 Before concluding that New York City is similar
to other cities, Professor Zeisel should explain this eighteen percent
difference.
Even without the variation in conviction rates, one would guess that
this conclusion of Professor Zeisel is wrong because of New York City's
size, its cosmopolitan nature, and the number of strangers and tourists it
attracts. In addition, New York City tolerates certain types of criminal
behavior which no other city in America would countenance. Where else,
for example, do drug dealers blatantly advertise their wares in a public
park, as they do in Washington Square? 36
30. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at A6, col. 6. Some of the demonstrators brought suit and
eventually recovered $2.5 million for violations of their constitutional rights. Id.
31. Pp. 19-21.
32. Pp. 3, 19-25. Professor Zeisel is not alone in his questionable reliance on New York City
data as a predictor for the rest of the country. The Vera Institute also concluded that New York City
is like other American cities, and therefore that New York statistics could be used to generalize about
the deterioration of felony arrests in other American cities. VFRA INST., supra note 6, at xii. To
Professor Zeisel's credit, the Vera Institute was even less convincing in explaining why New York
City is like other American cities.
33. Professor Zeisel in fact compares the rate of conviction in New York in 1973 with the rate of
conviction reported for Cleveland in 1928 by Felix Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound, and concludes that
the conviction rates for both cities were similar. See p. 21.
34. This is especially true given Professor Zeisel's view that law enforcement begins to do its job
only once a crime has occurred and been reported. P. 15.
35. P. 22.
36. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1982, at A49, col. 4.
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Yet another problem with The Limits of Law Enforcement is the dis-
crepancy between Professor Zeisel's conclusions and those of his collabo-
rators at the Vera Institute. As noted previously, the data that Professor
Zeisel uses were gathered in 1972 and 1973 as a result of a study by the
Vera Institute.37 The Vera Institute published its findings in 1977, while
The Limits of Law Enforcement did not come out until nearly ten years
after the data were collected. This time lag alone makes one wonder
whether the book's conclusions have any relevance today. Professor Zeisel
himself acknowledges that after the data were collected and while the data
were being analyzed, differences of opinion developed between himself
and the Vera Institute concerning the scope of the study. 8 One's suspi-
cions of Professor Zeisel's conclusions are only heightened by his frank
admission that his original collaborators do not agree with him. 9 A com-
parison of The Limits of Law Enforcement with the Vera publication
shows no significant difference in the data or the analysis of what factors
resulted in the deteriorations of felonies from arrests. The only significant
substantive difference between the two works is that the Vera Institute
was unwilling to reach Professor Zeisel's sweeping conclusion that law
enforcement alone is unable significantly to reduce crime.40
III.
In addition to its questionable documentation, The Limits of Law En-
forcement is flawed by numerous errors of omission. In light of his sweep-
ing conclusions, Professor Zeisel should have provided the reader with a
more comprehensive discussion of the exclusionary rule, falling crime
rates, and the benefits of the discretion that enforcement officials now
possess.
Professor Zeisel barely discusses the exclusion of evidence as a reason
for deterioration or dismissal of charges, 41 despite the hue and cry regard-
ing the impact of exclusion42 and the Burger Court's attack on the exclu-
sionary rule.43 He does acknowledge that, in order to enhance their
37. See supra p. 1400.
38. P. 6 n.5.
39. Id.
40. See VERA INST., supra note 6, at 146. ("[W]e must look principally to the streets of New
York-to the ways citizens behave and the ways police patrol and investigate crime-rather than to
our court process, if we wish to change the basic pattern of dispositions.") (emphasis added).
41. See p. 111 Table 2. Professor Zeisel lists the evidentiary reasons for dismissal, but does not
include probable exclusion of evidence as a possible reason.
42. See Welsh & Collins, A Matter of Eidence, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1983, at A25, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1983, at A26, col. 4; Wicker, In the Nation: Attack on the Fourth, N.Y. Times, Mar.
4, 1983, at A31, col.1 [hereinafter cited as Wicker, pt. 1]; Wicker, In the Nation: Attack on the
Fourth, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1983, at A31, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Wicker, pt. 2].
43. The Burger Court has significantly limited the scope of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (defendant's statements on cross-examination can be
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records, police officials frequently "overcharge" an accused individual,4
and that prosecutors frequently reduce such charges during the plea bar-
gaining process.45 But Professor Zeisel does not discuss reductions of
charges or dismissals that result from the prosecutor determining that evi-
dence was illegally seized, and would thus be excluded at trial."' Had
Professor Zeisel and the Vera Institute explored the deterioration of fel-
ony arrests caused by probable exclusion, the study might have provided a
valuable supplement to recent findings that exclusion of evidence rarely
changes the outcome of a criminal trial."
Another issue which Professor Zeisel should have explored but did not
is the fall in America's crime rate during the 1980's.4' Given the fact that
he waited so long to publish his results, Professor Zeisel should have at
least attempted to explain the demonstrable drop in crime and discuss
whether it had any bearing on his view that police are unable to reduce
significantly our crime rate. Law enforcement officials might argue that
the falling crime rate is a result of better police practices and more com-
impeached by government with illegally obtained evidence that is inadmissible as substantive evidence
of guilt); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1977) (grand jury witness may not refuse to
answer questions because questions are based on evidence obtained from unlawful search and seizure);
C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.03, at 18-30 (1980) (discussing diminishing scope of
exclusionary rule); Burkoff, Exclusionary Rules, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
719-23 (1983) (summarizing criticism of exclusionary rule's effectiveness as deterrent to illegal police
conduct and protector of judicial integrity). The best summary of the Burger Court's current view of
the exclusionary rule is Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens:
[T]he exclusionary rule does not ineluctably flow from a desire to insure that government
plays the "game" according to the rules. If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern
for official observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule. Nor is it
easy to understand how a court can be thought to endorse a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment by allowing illegally seized evidence to be introduced against a defendant if an effective
remedy is provided against the government.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The Court has also affirmatively sought arguments as to whether it should create a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Wicker, pt. 2, supra note 42; Wicker, pt. 1, supra note 42; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 21, 1983, at 26, col. 1; see also Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (Court expressed
desire to reach good faith exception issue).
44. Pp. 195-96.
45. Pp. 195-96.
46. See pp. 21-25.
47. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A STUDY IN
CALIFORNIA (1982); COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, REP. No. GGD79-45, IMPACT
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS (1979); K. BROSI, A CROSS-
CITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 18-20 (1979); see also C. SILBERMAN, supra note
8, at 263-65 (except for drug cases and "victimless crimes," few convictions are lost due to the exclu-
sionary rule). But see Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and
Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 257 (1973) (exclusionary rule permits many defendants with
criminal records to escape punishment). Most research on the effects of the exclusionary rule has
focused more on its deterrent effect on police behavior than on its effect on prosecutorial decisions. See
Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels: The Case
of the Exclusionary Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977); Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics
Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Oaks, Stud)ing the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970).
48. 1982 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 43 Table 2 (1982).
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munity participation in attempting to halt crime."' But the decline in the
crime rate may instead be a result of a change in public attitude toward
more vindictive, more retributivist criminal justice. Or perhaps the falling
crime rate stems from the maturing of the baby boom generation. As Pro-
fessor Zeisel notes, it has long been known that young men commit most
crimes.50
Obviously, Professor Zeisel must attribute the drop in crime to factors
other than law enforcement; otherwise, he would contradict the central
theme of his book. Whatever the real reasons for the decline, the reader is
entitled to know what Professor Zeisel thinks, especially since the decline
in crime occurred at a point when one would have expected an increase:
During the late 1970's and early 1980's, the economic and environmental
conditions in this country were precisely those which, according to Profes-
sor Zeisel, contribute to increased crime. One hopes that Professor Zeisel
and others will analyze and discuss the falling crime rate soon.
Professor Zeisel also fails to mention that the discretion in the criminal
justice system which results in charge reductions and dismissals is neces-
sary to achieve equity in the treatment of arrestees. The case histories
examined in The Limits of Law Enforcement certainly indicate the appeal
of such discretion. 1 For example, an accused with a record of continuous
criminal assaults on strangers and a first-time offender who assaults a
passing acquaintance in a barroom brawl present two quite different
cases.52 And according to both Professor Zeisel and the Vera Institute, the
first-time offender would in all likelihood have his charges dismissed. In
contrast, "[w]here crimes are serious, evidence is strong, and victims are
willing to prosecute, felons with previous criminal histories ended up with
relatively heavy sentences."'54 Professor Zeisel apparently believes that this
differential treatment of individuals based on the nature of their prior
records is healthy.55 One wonders why Professor Zeisel was not more
49. E.g., Hollingsworth, INCERT, The Citizen/Police Connection, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT
BULL Sept. 1982, at 12 passim.
50. Pp. 77-80.
51. E.g., pp. 150-51. Compare case 6 (on police overcharges of aggravated assault, harassment
and trespass, defendant receives 15 days on sole conviction of harassment) with case 7 (after refusing
plea bargain of maximum 4 year sentence on gun and narcotics charges, defendant receives 4 years on
sole conviction for narcotics charge).
52. See VERA INST., supra note 6, at 136-37.
53. P. 113, at Fig. 29; VERA INST., supra note 6, at 135-37.
54. VERA INST., supra note 6, at 134.
55. Professor Zeisel notes:
The question is whether [nonevidentiary considerations such as the minor character of the
offense or the defendant's lack of counsel] ought to affect the [prosecutor's] decision to dismiss
rather than be taken up by the sentencing judge after conviction. If we were to conclude that
the prosecutor ought to consider such nonevidentiary circumstances, the second question arises:
Whether these considerations should remain in his unfettered discretion or be controlled at
least by internal guidelines ....
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forceful in discussing the broader implications of this discretion. If
prosecutorial discretion in the system results in a sense of rough justice
being done, then attempts to eliminate other forms of discretion in the
system must be considered.
IV.
A more important problem with The Limits of Law Enforcement is that
it offers few concrete suggestions as to what society can do to combat
crime.5" Given Professor Zeisel's conclusion that law enforcement alone is
helpless to reduce crime, one would expect that he would present some
concrete proposals for combating crime. But Professor Zeisel's suggestions,
such as they are, are vague and sometimes even flippant.
For example, he writes in a footnote that perhaps Hank Aaron and
Willie Mays should be asked to become school principals as part of the
educational reform necessary to combat crime.57 Baseball players may be
good role models for some children, but they do not have the managerial
or teaching skills necessary to run a school. While advocating educational
reform, Professor Zeisel unwittingly trivializes the importance of the edu-
cational system and its leaders.
Professor Zeisel's vague suggestions about educational reform are use-
ful, however, because they highlight the need for greater interdisciplinary
research and for coordinated proposals to solve the problems of juvenile
delinquency and adult criminal conduct. Because educational reform is
supposedly a major concern of the Reagan Administration,5 8 it may be a
good time for Professor Zeisel and others who share his views to offer
some specific proposals to eliminate crime. Otherwise, they run the risk of
being labeled "all talk and no action."
One interesting point which Professor Zeisel makes regarding crime
prevention is that better lighting reduces theft.59 What Professor Zeisel
ignores, however, is that local law enforcement agencies often led the ef-
forts for better lighting, as well as those for neighborhood watch associa-
tions and improved security devices.60 If these efforts by law enforcement
Thus, there is some leeway for more vigorous prosecution, although the costs of obtaining
convictions in these cases are likely to exceed those of the average case.
P. 28.
56. Pp. 83-88.
57. P. 88 n.80.
58. President's Remarks at the National Association of Secondary School Principals 68th Annual
Convention and Exhibit in Las Vegas, Nevada, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 182, 183 (Feb. 7,
1984).
59. P. 85.
60. A. REiss, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); Another Way to Fight Crime, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1982, § 11 (N.J. Weekly), at 26 (discussing effectiveness of crime prevention programs in
Morris County, New Jersey).
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agencies to prevent burglary and other theft-related crimes have been ef-
fective, Professor Zeisel should at least give credit where credit is due. Of
course, to do so would call into question Professor Zeisel's main point that
law enforcement cannot have a significant impact on crime.
Professor Zeisel also fails to acknowledge that better training of law
enforcement officials can have a significant impact on their handling and
obtaining of evidence. The push for better training began in the 1960's
when the Supreme Court called national attention to the dramatic dispar-
ity between the conduct of state and local police and the constitutional
ideal.61 High on the agenda of the Warren Court was controlling the con-
duct of what they perceived as poorly educated, undertrained, unprofes-
sional police. The lw enforcement community has responded with a con-
certed effort to upgrade the training, education, pay, and professionalism
of state and local police.62
Better-trained police can gather stronger evidence, improve community
relations, and fight crime more effectively. Even if law enforcement has
only a limited effect on crime, more sophisticated training can substan-
tially expand law enforcement's limits.
Another factor that Professor Zeisel should have explored is the need
for courts to make clear the rules governing police conduct. For example,
the clarity of the Miranda rules allowed police to use the warnings rou-
tinely soon after the decision itself,"' and today few cases are lost as a
result of noncompliance with Miranda.
By contrast, the unpredictability of case-by-case decisions makes it diffi-
cult for police to determine the proper standards for their conduct and
leads to cases being lost because police do not know what they are allowed
to do in a given situation.6" The appropriate geographic scope of warrant-
61. See, e.g., decisions establishing exclusionary rule in state and federal criminal proceedings.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (identifications); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (lineups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (searches and seizures).
62. Among the most successful educational efforts has been the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
National Academy Program. Each year, some 1200 state and local officers attend a three-month pro-
gram at the FBI's college campus in Quantico, Virginia. The officers take classes in law, psychology,
behavioral science, business, forensic science, weapons training, and education. The program includes
speakers and teachers from outside law enforcement in an effort to challenge stereotyped thinking.
Residential living offers extensive opportunities for informal discussion while freeing the students
from the pressures that beset many on-duty, intradepartmental training programs. The program is
designed not only to improve the effectiveness of each student, but also to benefit his or her depart-
ment as a whole when the graduate returns to work. The National Academy also serves as a model
for states establishing their own educational and training programs. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, POSTGRADUATE EVALUATION OF THE F.B.I. NATIONAL
ACADEMY (1984); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TRAINING NEEDS
ASSESSMENT F.B.I. NATIONAL ACADEMY (1984).
63. See LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an hnperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"
and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 320-33 (1982).
64. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
1409
The Yale Law Journal
less searches incident to a lawful arrest provides a classic example of the
need for clear rules to guide the police. 5 From 1950 until 1969, the Su-
preme Court, while suggesting a geographic limitation on such searches,
refused to articulate a guiding principle as to what the limit was." In-
stead, each case was to be decided on its own facts long after the warrant-
less search occurred, thereby encouraging defense attorneys to claim that
the search in their particular case was beyond the permissible scope. Be-
cause the police and lower courts had no reliable way to know what was
permissible, the courts wasted time on needless litigation and the police
wasted effort in pressing charges that later proved to have no admissible
evidentiary support.
In 1969, the Supreme Court finally defined the permissible geographic
scope of warrantless searches incident to lawful arrest: When someone is
arrested, the police may search the arrestee and areas into which he might
reach to grab a weapon or destroy evidence.6 7 Like all rules, the "wing-
span" rule has fuzzy margins, but any police officer now knows that if
you arrest a person in his front hall you may not search his attic incident
to that arrest. When the police know more clearly what they may and
may not do, the state will lose fewer cases due to police errors. Professor
Zeisel seems to have ignored how clear-cut rules can help police perform
in a manner which is likely to lead to stronger cases.
In addition to better police training and rule-oriented decisionmaking,
Professor Zeisel's work also suggests that a crucial step in reducing crime
is rethinking how we deal with violence between individuals who know
one another, especially those within the family." Both Professor Zeisel
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 243-44 (1983); LaFave, supra note 63, at 321-23
(1982); Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1122, 1131-40
(1982); see also Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 813-14 (1970) (due process requires "uniform, usable and regular" rules of
law, but judicial system cannot control police practices at the lowest levels).
65. Another good example is the confusion relating to automobile searches. Compare Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (warrantless search of closed container in car impermissible) and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (warrantless search of personal luggage in car impermissi-
ble) with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless search of passenger compartment
and containers permissible, if probable cause exists with respect to concealment of contraband) and
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (warrantless search of jacket and closed container in pas-
senger compartment of car, contemporaneous with custodial arrest, permissible). See C. WHrrE-
BREAD, supra note 43, § 7.01-.06, at 141-52; id., § 7.02-.04, at 29-35 (Supp. 1982); Katz, United
States v. Ross: Evolving Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOCY 172
(1983); Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search
of a Clearer Label, 27 MER CER L. REV. 987 (1976); Note, Drawing Lines Around the Fourth
Amendment: Robbins v. California and New York v. Belton, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 483 (1982); see
also Arenella, supra note 64, at 234 n.259 (Burger Court willing to promote ad hoc balancing test to
judge the reasonableness of police investigations).
66. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (overruling United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950)).
67. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 768.
68. As the Vera Institute's study explains:
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and the Vera study demonstrate that, when a prior relationship exists be-
tween victim and assailant, the assailant sometimes received lesser punish-
ment, but often received none at all.69 While some of this disparity arises
because victims who know their assailants frequently drop the charges
upon resolving the dispute which led to the arrest, 0 it is also clear that
the criminal justice system treats disputes between those who know each
other differently than it treats disputes between strangers.71 For example,
police are often less likely to arrest someone when they are responding to
a domestic disturbance, because in some instances they are able, at least
temporarily, to resolve the situation which led to the criminal conduct.
7 2
In other cases, the police are unwilling to make an arrest because they feel
that the complainant will not follow through with prosecution or because
they do not view a domestic dispute as sufficiently serious to warrant an
arrest. In recent years, many have criticized the police for failing to inter-
vene and take domestic violence seriously.
7 3
Professor Zeisel should have discussed whether the criminal justice sys-
tem's differential treatment of prior-relationship crimes is the proper re-
sponse from a policy standpoint. We should, for example, attempt to de-
termine whether individuals who commit crimes against people they know
Our penal laws make no mention of the prior relationship factor. This study does not purport
to resolve the question of whether the high fallout of personal relationship crimes is to society's
good or detriment; nor does it indicate what happens after the victim and defendant leave the
courthouse and go home. Do prior relationship assaults return to the courts as prior relation-
ship homicides, or do the individuals live happily ever after? How often do assaults on family
members within the home escalate to assaults on strangers in the streets? Clearly there is a
need for research in these areas.
VERA INST., supra note 6, at 136.
69. See id. at 28; p. 114.
70. Pp. 114-15.
71. See Buchanan & Hankins, Family Disturbance Intervention Program, FBI L. ENFORCE-
MENT BULL., Nov. 1983, at 10; see also Bruno v. Codd, 4 FAM. L. REP. 3095 (1978) (12 battered
wives brought suit against the police for failing to arrest men when they beat their wives), 67 A.D.2d
582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978) (dismissing suits), aff'd on other grounds, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d
976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
72. See Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1978), aff'd, 417
N.Y.S.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); see also Loving & Quirk, Spouse Abuse-The Need for New
Law Enforcement Responses, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 1982, at 10-11 (describing one
police force's rejection of crisis intervention approach to spouse abuse, which emphasized reconcilia-
tion and arrest avoidance). The authors make the interesting point that some law enforcement officers
may be reluctant to respond to domestic disputes at all, given the "physical danger these calls pose for
all police officers." Id. at 10.
73. See C. FLAMMANG, THE POLICE AND THE UNDERPROTECTED CHILD (1970); Field & Field,
Marital Violence and the Criminal Process: Neither Justice Nor Peace, 47 Soc. SERv. REV. 221,
226-30 (1973); Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914,
916-22, 940-42. But see Buchanan & Hankins, supra note 71 (describing Washington D.C. police
force's crisis intervention program, which has reduced assaults on trained officers and improved police
attitudes toward intervening in domestic situations).
Interestingly, in cases where a victim has a prior relationship with the perpetrator, it is frequently
easy for the police to make an arrest. Generally, the victim will know where the assailant lives, or will
at least be able to make a positive identification of the assailant. Of course, although it is easy to
obtain an arrest, it is frequently difficult to obtain a conviction on any charge.
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also commit crimes against strangers."' One might suppose that a person
who steals from his grandmother or his neighbor would have no compunc-
tion about stealing from a stranger.75 Perhaps treating prior-relationship
cases more seriously would thereby also reduce crime between strangers.
Professor Zeisel, however, does not seriously deal with this issue.
7 1
Perhaps the only effective way to reduce or eliminate crime is to rethink
our attitude towards prior-relationship cases. Indeed, one could argue that
violence between people involved in a relationship is more serious and
more threatening than violence or criminal activity between strangers. In-
dividuals in a close relationship, whether familial or otherwise, are in a
relationship which requires trust and support. That trust and support is
the very fabric of our social order. Those who violate that trust by engag-
ing in crime or violence may damage our society more seriously than the
stranger who knocks someone down and steals a purse or wallet. So long
as we tolerate a great deal of criminal activity against us by those we
know, we tacitly approve the behavior they engage in and thereby approve
the same sort of behavior towards strangers. Furthermore, numerous stud-
ies have indicated that children who come from homes where there has
been abuse or violence often become abusive and violent parents.77 It
would not be surprising to learn that these children also become abusive
and violent toward strangers and everyone else.
Perhaps we should start treating prior-relationship cases more seriously
than we currently do, given that the Vera study indicates that prior-
relationship assaults generally involve more serious injuries. 8 In addition,
such assaults more frequently involve the use of weapons than do assault
cases involving strangers. 9 In light of these facts, it would be appropriate
for law enforcement officials to treat prior-relationship cases as seriously
as other cases. In conjunction with this change in official attitude, law
74. Professor Zeisel does recognize that arrests and convictions refer to people, and do not neces-
sarily correlate to reported crimes which relate to events. In other words, a person may be arrested
and convicted for one crime, yet be responsible for other reported crimes. P. 17.
75. Of course, certain crimes done in "the heat of passion" generally occur only between people in
some sort of romantic or familial relationship. Cf. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 76, at 575-76 (1972) (in adultery cases, most jurisdictions classify the intentional killing
of an adulterous spouse as voluntary manslaughter).
76. The Vera Institute's book, in contrast, concludes that, by processing interpersonal disputes,
the criminal justice system has less time to deal decisively with "real" felons. VERA INST., supra note
6, at xxv.
77. See L. PELTON, THE MYTH OF CLASSLESSNESS-CHILD ABUsE AND NEGLECT 20 (1978);
Kempe, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. A.M.A. 18-19 (1962); Steele & Pollock, A Psychiatric
Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD 103 (R. Heifer
& C. Kempe eds. 1968). Greater police intervention here should lead to fewer future cases, in addi-
tion to achieving the primary goal of preventing current child abuse and neglect. But see Wald, State
Inten,ention on Behalf of"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV.
985 (1975) (arguing for less state intervention in the family).
78. VERA INST., supra note 6, at 29-30.
79. Id. at 30-31.
1412
Vol. 93: 1399, 1984
Law Enforcement
enforcement officials could begin to direct public attention toward the seri-
ousness of prior-relationship cases, and toward the need for cooperation
by witnesses and complainants in prosecuting individuals who perpetrate
crimes upon people they know. This program might be a first step toward
overcoming the violence rampant in our homes, our families, and our soci-
ety in general. A program of this sort might also eliminate some of the
public outcry about lenient judges who coddle criminals.80 Considering the
number of prior-relationship cases, the real coddlers of criminals are the
victims and our society for tolerating so much criminal activity among
people who know each other.
Rethinking how we handle prior-relationship crimes is just one way in
which law enforcerment can have an effect on crime rates in this country.
Better police training and greater clarity in procedural rules may also
produce a demonstrable increase in convictions. This is not to say that
Professor Zeisel is incorrect in directing attention to the causes of criminal
activity. Undoubtedly our real hope for eradicating criminal activity lies
with eradicating the causes of crime. But in negating the ability of law
enforcement to reduce crime significantly, Professor Zeisel overstates his
case.
80. See TwENTiETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CER-
TAIN PUNISHMENT 3 (1976); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 158-66 (1975).
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